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IN THE SUPREME C,QURT
of the

S(TATE OF UTAH
ARNOLD HAYMORE AND ELAINE
H. HAYMORE,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.REUBEN J. LEVINSON AND YETTA
LEVINSON,
Defendants.

Case No.
8793

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to compel release of escrow money
under a contract for the sale of a house which was
under construction. Plaintiffs brought suit as vendors
in a written contract for the sale of real estate and
demanded payment of $3,000.00 which had been withheld from the purchase price pending satisfactory completion of certain work. Defendants denied that the rPquired work had been performed, and counterclaimed
for damages resulting from inferior workmanship and
defect.s in the house. The trial court, sitting witltou t a
jury, denied defendants' counter claim and entered judgment against them in the sum of $2,739.00. Frotn this
judgment, the defendants appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
March of 1955 respondents began construction of a
house on certain premises located at 4210 Holloway
Drive in Salt Lake c·ounty (T-7, 36). It was thought that
the house would be built for sale, but, if a purchaser
were not available, respondents would move into the
house ( T -6). On X ovember 7, 1955, when the house was
nearly completed, respondents and appellants entered
into a contract whereby respondents agreed to sell and
appellants agreed to purchase the house (Exhibit 1).
It was agreed, however, that the house "~as not yet complete and of the $36,000.00 total purchase price, $3,000.00
should be put in escrow and delivered to respondents
only after satisfactory co1npletion of the remaining work
(Exhibit 1). Certain items were specified as essential
parts of the "~ork to be satisfactorily completed, and a list
of these items, including a one year guarantee against
~tructural defects, ,,~as attached to the contract as Exhibit
~\ (l~xhibit 2). It "\Yas finall:~ agreed that respondents
\Youlrl hr allo,ved a period of ninet:~ days to complete the
rPntaining "~ork under the contract (Exhibit 1).
l~~videner .adduced at the trial revealed that appellant~ "·ere di~htrbed by a series of items 'Yhich reflected
either dt'fretivr Inaterials or careless workluanship. It
\r:t~ tP~tifit'd that re~pondents l1ad agreed to supply a
(1rneral T~~h,etrje pull-out t~~pe disl1,,-asher and disposal
u11it. ( I~~xhihit ~).but "-hen the installation "~.as n1ade the
d i~1nrn~hrr "·n,s nl1o\Y<:'d to protrude t\YO inches beyond
t.1u' rt~~t of the cabinet (T-3S). Further. it 'Yas shown
that. dPspitt' respondents' pronrise to purchase and install
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the dishwasher, they delayed payment for more than
four months and appellants finally became embarrassed
over the protracted refusal to pay and paid for it themselves (T-36-37). Aside from respondents' excuse that
the di.s hwasher happened to be the wrong size to fit
properly, there was nowhere any evidence to show that
they had made any attempt to make a proper installation.
As further evidence of unsatisfactory workmanship
and defective material, appellant Mrs. Levinson testified that the acoustical tile, which was .applied to the
basement ceiling after the contract of sale, had started
to fall off and that at the time of the trial it was off
in many spots (T-41, 42); that there was a hole in one
of the basement bedroom walls through which one could
see into the furnace room ( T -42) ; that respondents had
misfortune with the paint on one of the basement walls
and, in their attempt to remedy it by blending it with
another color, made things worse by producing a sort
of patchwork design of two colors ( T-44) ; that respondents promised that a lawn had already been planted but
that nothing appeared but a vigorous patch of mustard
weeds (T-45); that the doors of the house were all
warped; particularly the bathroom door which was so
mis-shapen that it wouldn't close, and that respondents
promised that the doors "would all be taken care of"
(T-46, 47) ; that the bath tub in the basement had an
unsightly rust appearance which cannot be removed
(T-47); that the drain in the basement will not function,
despite efforts of plumbers which have been hj red by
appellants, leaving the basement partly filled with water
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from the air conditioner during the summer (T-48);
that the dampers in the fire places were not installed or
were improperly installed because snow and rain storms
always fill the fireplace with water (T-49); that a cement
wall surrounding the patio was cracked and had to be
repaired and paid for by appellants (T-51); that respondent.s promised to supply two forty-gallon water
heaters, but that they totally failed to do so (T-82, 83);
and that appellants had to clean paint stains from the
chrome, tile and floor (T-88).
The most serious single defect alleged by appellants
\\Tas with regard to 'a concrete slab top to the garage.
This structure was actually attached to the hou.se and
\Vas designed to serve as a summer outdoor living patio
on the upper surface, as ''ell as a roof for the garage.
When appellants inspected the house prior to purchase,
they were unable to detect any cracks in this structure
( T -95). On the day they actually moved into the house,
however, they noticed a substantial crack in the cement
"·all \vhich surrounded the garage (T -95). Later on,
"·hpn appellant ){rs. Levinson washed the patio, she
firRt notie.ed that \\·ater leaked through the cement and
into the ga.ragP (T-1:20). The leak "~as in the nature of
a ra~t dripping all around the sides and in the center,
and tl1P cars \\·ere drenched (T-45, 46).
rpJH'rP \\•as C\"id~"\nee introduced at the trial to ShOW
t.hnt it '"ould eo~t appella11ts a substantial sum to remedy
the d(\ r('et~ InPntionPd. The necessary re-painting in the
Jo\\'(\r pfevnt ion, according to an est:llna.te of a painter
of eon~iderablc cxperienee, \\'"ould cost $694.00 (T-77).
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Repair of the leaky garage roof and patio, according
to a builder of long experience, would cost $1,287.50 plus
tax (T-19). These items, plu.s the dishwasher and disposal
units, and estimated costs ·on other items, caused appellants to calculate their loss from respondents' breach
of contract to be $4,000.00 (R-Answer & Counterclaim).
On one occasion respondent Mr. Haymore arrived at
appellants' house for the purpose of repairing some of
the acoustical tile, and he was asked by appellant Mrs.
Levinson whether he intended to repair or alter any
of the other items (T-88). Mr. Haymore replied that he
did not, and appellant Mrs. Levinson then said that she
was disappointed with a great deal of the work and
that it would not be complete satisfaction to have only
the tile on the ceiling replaced ( T -88). Whereupon respondent Haymore left the premises and never returned
to finish any of the work.
Upon the unwillingness of respondents to perform
the work requested by appellants, and upon the unwillingness of appellants to release to respondents the
$3,000.00 in escrow until such work was performed, the
respondents brought suit upon the contract to collect
the $3,000.00. The trial court found that respondents
had performed their obligations under the contract, with
the exception of appliances and work amounting to
$261.00, and thereupon entered judgment against appellants in the sum of $2, 739.00. The court further found
that there were no structural defe-cts in the house and
that there were no express or implied ~?arranties a~ to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the condition of th.e house. Therefore, .appellants' counterclaim was completely disallowed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE EFFECT
TO THE EXPRESS CONDITION THAT THE WORK MUST
BE PERFORMED TO THE APPELLANTS' (PURCHASERS')
SATISFACTION.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE EFFECT
TO THE EXPRESS ONE YEAR GUARANTEE AGAINST
STRUCTURAL DEFECTS.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE TRIAL ·COURT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE EFFECT
TO THE EXPRESS CONDITION THAT THE 'YORK l\I"UST
BE PERFORMED TO THE APPELLANTS' (PURCHASERS')
SATISFACTION.

It is first necessary to revie"T the nature and essence
of the contract in question. ....\.ppellants n1ade an offer
to purehase on ,an approved forn1 of the l~tah State
Securities Co1n1ni,ssion and the Salt Lake Real Estate
Board. This for.1n \vas entitled HEarnest ~Ioney Receipt
and Offer to Purehasen (Exhibit 1). _._\.ppellants offered
to pay a total purchase p-rice of $36,000.00 for the house
in question, but, since it \vasn ~t quite con1pleted, they
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included as part of their offer the provision that $3,000.00
of this price would be placed in escrow and released
only upon the .satisfactory completion of the work remaining (Exhibit 1). It was provided that this work must
be performed within sixty days, but the offer. was later
amended to allow ninety days. It is important to stress
the fact that appellants insisted upon "·satisfactory completion" of the work, and in order to so provide they
included that express provision as a condition precedent
to payment. Otherwise, there would have been no condition of personal satisfaction in the "form" contract.
If respondents (vendor-builder) had not been vvilling
to undertake to complete the house to the satisfaction
of .appellants, they should have objected to that provision
in the offer before they accepted it.
The trial oourt, in ignoring this condition of satisfactory completion, violated the most fundamental concept of contract law: That a man ought to be required
to do what he has promised to do. The elemental contract law of offer and acceptance concerns itself with
promises which people make to each other in the busine'Ss
world. When one party offers to purchase under certain
conditions or limitations, and the other party accepts
that offer, the parties are held to the bargain that they
have made. The fundamental concern is that if parties
are not legally bound by their contracts, there could be
no order or progress in the business world. Similarly,
if one paDty :Us free to alter his promise after the1 (~ont1 r1act
is entered into, commercial confusion would result.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

authorities are in unanimou.s accord to the effect that
a promise to perfonn to the satisf.action of the other
party is enforceable. Excerpts from Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 17, c·ontracts, Sec. 495 are helpful. In
explaining the general nature of this type of contract,
it states:
"Contracts in which one party agrees to perform to the satisfaction of the other are ordinarily
divided into two classes: Where fancy, taste,
sensibility, or judgment are involved; and where
the question is merely one of operative fitness
or mechaniCJal utility. •Satisfactory' in cases of the
character under consideration means satisfactory
to the promisor, if the contract is silent as to the
person to whom the work, etc., shall be satisfactory." (emphasis added)
·When the contract is to perform to one's personal
taste or judgment, the refusal to accept such performance
is completely within the prerogative of the person to
be satisfied. The party obligated to perform cannot complain if the rejection is unreasonable :
"In contract.s involving matters of fancy,
taste, or judgment, \vhen one party agrees to
perfor1n to the satisfaction of the other, he renders
the other party the sole judge of his satisfaction,
and this ordinarily \Yithout regard to the justice
or reasonableness of his decision~ and a court
or jury cannot .say that such party should ha\e
been s.atisfied where he asserts that he is not.~'
If, on the other hand, the contract to satisfy concerns something of operative fitness or mechanical utility,
the test might be somewhat different. It is clear that
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the person to be satisfied still has the right to refuse
the performance if his decision is a reasonable one.
Further, there is considerable .authority to the effect
that, if the refusal is in good faith, the court cannot
inquire whether the rejection is unreasonable:
"Where a contract involving operative fitness
or mechanical utility clearly provides that performance shall be s.ati.sfactory to the promisor,
he is generally held to be the sole judge of his
own satisfaction in the matter, if ... he acts in
good faith."
"It would seem that, where the subject matter
of the contract involves a question ·of individual
taste or sentiment rather than of utility, neither
the good f.aith or genuineness, nor the rea;sonableness, of the expressed dissatisfaction can be inquired into. There is, however, authority for the
proposition that the dissatisfaction must be honestly entertained even in such a case.
"Where the subject matter of the contract
relates to a thing which is ordinarily desirable only
bec.ause of its commercial value or its mechanical
fitness, it is held that the party must act in good
faith and must be honestly dissatisfied."
Moving to a specific consideration of contracts involving building or construction contracts, the rule is
that the building must satisfy the purchaser if the contract so provides. In thi.s respect, the dissatisfaction
of the purchaser must be in good faith and the mere
fact that the refusal is unreasonable is not determinative
of bad faith:
"Where the contract merely requires the
builder to perform the work according to certain
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plans and specifications, it is not necessary, in
case the work is so performed, that it also be
performed to the satisfaction of the owner. Where,
however, the contract so provides, the work must
be performed to the owner's satisfaction, in the
absence of a waiver or estopp-el. The dissatisfaction of the owner must be in good faith. It has
been held that bad faith is not conclusively shown
even by unreasonable dissatisfaction, and that the
promisee cannot recover where the promisor is
not satisfied, even though he should be satisfied."
( em:phasi's 'adderd)
These principles quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum
are completely affirmed in American Jurisprudence,
Volume 12, Contracts §§ 340-41. The Restatement of
Contracts, § 265, summarizes the same rules. The Utah
law also is in firm accord with these principles. The leading case, Midgley v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 38 Utah 293, 112
Pac. 820 (1911), \vi1l be discussed later. It seems unnecessary at this point to set out additional authority
purely £or thre purpose of <'Orrohorating principles of law
about which there is no dispute.
Far more helpful, and the best analy-sis of the law
in this area, is the analysis found in Corbin on Contracts,
One Volume Edition, §§ 645-48 (1952). In light of the
excellence of Professor Corbin's analy-sis, and his exposition of the underlying reasons supporting these rules
of law, a rather extensive excerpt s-ee1ns justified:
"In spite of depressions, political changes~
and group pressures barked by force, \Ye still have
freedom of contract in a high degree: and the
contract that we have chosen to -Jnake -zvill usu,alh!
be enforced by the courts as we have made it.
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So, a contractor can, by the use of clear and appropriate words, make his own duty expressly conditional upon his own personal satisfaction with
the quality of the performance for which he ha8
bargained and in return for which his promise is
given." (~em·plhasriJs 1added)

* * * *
"Consider and compare the following bilateral
contracts:
A

promises to do certain work.

I.
{ B

promises to pay $100.

"In this case there are mutual promises that
are mutually dependent, but nothing is said about
anybody's satisfaction. If A does the work in accordance with specifications, he has fully discharged his duty and B has no claim for damages
even though he is not satisfied. Also, B is under
a duty to p.ay the full amount promised even
though he is not satisfied. B's personal satisfaction
has not been promised by A, nor is it a condition
precedent to B 's duty to pay. ( 1emphla~sis added)
II.

{

A

promises to do specified work to the personal
satisfaction of B.

B

promises to pay $100.

"In this case also we have mutual promises
that are mutually dependent. The only difference
between this and the first case supposed above
is that now A has not only promised to do the
work according to specifications; he has also
promised to do it to the satisfaction of B. If
he does not do the work to B's s.a tis faction, he
has broken his promise; and B could maintain
an action for damages, although these damages
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would be only nominal, in case the work is proved
to be in accordance with specifications. In this
case B's duty to p.ay the contract price is not
expre·ssly made conditional upon his O"\Vn satisfaction. T:he fact tha.t A 1has expressly promised
to satisfy B is not at all the same things as to make
B's duty to pay expressly conditional upon his
satisfaction. Nevertheless, if the character of the
work that is promised by A is of such a kind that
its excellence or accuracy is largely a matter of
personal taste and feelings and cannot readily be
determined by objective standards, performance
of A's p·romise to the satisfaction of B will probably be held to be of the essence of the contract.
If such is the case, B' s personal satisfaction will
be held by construction of law to be a condition
precedent to B's duty to pay, even though the
terr~ts of the contract did not rnake it such a condition in express words. (emphasis added)

III.

A

promises to do specified work.

B

promises to pay $100 if the work as done is
satisfactory to him p·ersonally.

"Here we have another valid bilateral contract. A has promised to do the \York in accordance
with specifications, but he has not pronrised to
produce satisfaction in B. If the \York is done according to specifications, _._\_ l1as con1pletely performed his contractural duty, eYen though B is
not satisfied 'vith the result: and B can n1aintain
no action for damages against A. On the other
hand, B has e~rpressly ·Jnade h£s duty to pay $100
conditional upon his OU'n personal satisfaction_;
and if he is in good fat~fh not satisfied he is -not
bouu.d to pay the $100, even though, in the opinion
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of other competent critics, A's work is exactly in
accoTdance with specifications. A has not fulfilled
a condition precedent to B's duty, although he
has f~tlly performed his own duty as required
by his express promise. This is applicable to building contracts and other kinds, as well as to those
more definitely involving matters of personal taste
and feeling; but in such cases we may find the
court failing to observe the express condition, or
else refusing to give it effect, in order to avoid
an unjust result. c·ourts prefer to interpret even
such words .as these as requiring only the satisfacti·on of a reasonable man!'' (emphasis added)
The contract in the case .at bar is clearly a bilateral
contract falling within Corbin's Class III. Professor Corbin then continues to analyze contracts involving personal
taste and personal fancy and explains that the subjective
judgn1ent of the person to be satisfied in conclusive.
l-Ie s.ays that "it is enough for us to be sure that according to standards of men in general [the purchaser]
ought not to be compelled to pay without being personally
satisfied." Finally, Professor Corbin considers the question whether there should ever be a judicial disregard
of express words of condition:
"Where two parties have made a bilateral
contr.act in which A promises to render a specified
perfonnance and B promises to pay therefor on
the express condition of his personal satisfaction
with the performance rendered, should the courts
ever enforce B's promise to pay in spite of his
honest but unreasonable dissatisfaction? When A
has convinced court and jury that he had performed his promise according to specific.ations, it
often seems harsh and unjust to deny judgment
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for the promised compensation. In the absence
of fraud or mistake, courts generally deny that
they can or will ever set aside an express condition, even though it is the personal state of the
mind of an interested party. But they often can
and do produce the same result by indulging in
a process of pseudo-interpretation, finding that
the language used means the 'satisfaction of a
reasonable man.' When this is in fact what is
done, it is a substitution by the court of a reasonable condition precedent in place of what seems
to the court an unreasonable condition precedent.
Such pseudo-interpretation as this, constitutes a
judicial limitation upon the freedom of contract
of the parties. It may perhaps be justifiable at
times, because of inequality in the economic bargaining power of the parties at the time they make
the contract. Such inequality, however, has not yet
consciously and openly been recognized by the
courts as a reason for limiting freedom of contract and for depriving the party in the superior
economic position of some of the advantages that
would be his by the express terms of the agreement.'' ( emp.ha;sis added)
The law is clear. The question, then, is one of fact
In determining whether a house is a tiring of personal
taste and enjoyment or merely a thing of mechanical
utility. It is sub1nitted that a house should rank high
among those aesthetic things "Thich are dependent upon
personal satisfaction and taste, rather than things of
mere op·erative fitness or mechanical utility. Appellants
agreed to spend $36,000.00 to acquire a house that 'Yould
be their ho1ne. There they "~ould live their lives, and
there they would entertain their friends, relatiYes and
social visitors. It 'vould be difficult to say that the finish-
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ing and decorating of a house does not contribute to
one's personal fancy, taste, and judgment. Aside from
the express promise to render .a "satisfactory completion," respondents agreed to allow appellants to select
the colors for the finishing and the knobs for all of the
closets and dra-vvers (Exhibit 2). Thus, it is clear that
respondents knew that appellants had a vital personal
interest in the quality and appearance of their home.
The only Utah case of consequence in this area of
the law, Midgley v. Campbell Building, Co., supra, offers
some help. That case held that in a contract for the construction of a public building a promise for "the faithful
execution of the work to the full and complete satisfaction of the supervising architect'' did not allow the
architect's rejection to be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious. The court held that when a contract specifies
that Clow & Sons plumbing fixtures are to be installed
and the building contractor installs Crane & Co. plumbing fixtures of equal quality, it is unre~sona.ble for the
supervising architect to reject the building solely on that
ground. The Court could see little aesthetic value or
artistic taste in public wash basins and urinals. Public
urinals, however, are clearly distinguishable from the
decoration and finishing of a private home, and the
c·ourt so recognized:
"The (defendant) has referred us to numerous cases to the effect, and with which holdings
we concur, that where a promisor agrees to pay
for work or goods provided he is satisfied with
them he cannot, if he is not satisfied, be made to
accept and pay for them, or be compelled to pay
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for them if he rejects them; and that the right,
except for fraud or bad faith, to inquire into the
ground for his action, is ordinarily excluded. In
such case, when he has not accepted the goods or
the benefit of the work, it generally is sufficient
that he said he was "not satisfied." This principle,
however, is more generally applied to cases involving taste, fancy, sensibility, or judgment of
the promisor * * * The principle, has also been
applied by some of the courts to questions involving not only fancy, taste, etc., but also to
what is termed by them operative fitness or mechanical utility. References to the cases may be
formd in 9 Cyc. 617-624. ( emphirusis ~dded)
Appellants contracted for certain items to be furnished and certain work to be performed in the completion
of their home. It is clear that it was the taste and judgment of the appellants (purchasers) which \\as to be
satisfied. They were the ones who made the offer and
who included that provision as a condition precedent.
Even if it could be argued that it is uncertain "'\rho is
to be satisfied, the la"'\v is unequivocal to the effect that
in such a situation the purchaser is presumed to be
the one who must be satisfied. Corpus Juris Secundunz,
Volume 17, Contracts Sec. 495 (a); Willianzs r. Hirshorn,
91 N. J. Law 419, 103 Atl. :23: Solonzou t. Ford,. 108 Pa.
Super. 43, 164 Atl. 92; 13 Corpus Juris 675~ note 29.
Until this 'vork satisfied a.ppellants' personal taste
and judgn1ent, the sun1 of $3,000.00 held in esrro"'\Y vras
not to be released. Under the very clear pronouncen1ent
of .all of the authorities, appellants, refusal to accept
the vvork could be unreasonable so long as it "'\Yas an
honest dissatisfaetion. 1f this Court disagrees, and holds
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that a private home is not a thing of personal taste, but
merely a thing of mechanical utility, then there is still
considerable authority to the effect that the refusal can
be unreasonable if it is in good faith. But, even if this
Court should apply the strictest test which courts have
applied to things of mechanical utility, that of reasonableness, appellants must still prevail. The evidence at the
trial indicated that appellants' refusal to accept was
very re.asonable. Testimony as to respondents' careless
work and faulty installation was given by appellant
Mrs. Levinson ( T -36-52, 81-90), experienced builder Mr.
Roberg (T-17-21), and experienced painter Mr. Keene
(T-25-34). Thus, even under the test most favorable to
respondents, appellants are justified in their reasonable
dissatisf.action and consequent refusal to release the
escrow money.
This does not mean that respondents are without
a remedy if they have rendered a substantial pe-rformance which is benefitting appellants. If the contract is
one for personal taste and judgment, the person obligated
to perform is excused from further efforts .after making
an honest attempt to perform, and only nominal damages
will be charged against him. Corpus Juris Secundum,
Volume 17, Contracts Sec. 495(b); Corbin on Contracts,
Sec. 645. And if the contract is one for operative fitness
or mechanical utility, the person obligated to perform
may seek compens.ation measured by the actual benefit
which the other party derives from such services. This
remedy is similar to quantum meruit, restitution, or
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unjust enrichment and is explained by Corbin in Section
648.
The error of the trial court was in refusing to give
any consideration at all to the condition precedent of
satisfaction of the purchasers, and in merely assuming
that respondents had performed all of their obligations
if their work could be considered average by some members of the building industry. This seems to be using
a test similar to the implied warranty of merchantability in the law of sales of p,ersonal property, (even a
le,sser requirement than reasonable fitness for the pur;..
pose), and goes contrary to every basic principle of
contract law which requires a party to answer for the
express promises which he has made. The judgn1ent of
the trial court should be reversed, and if respondents
are entitled to any remedy at all, it should be for the
reasonable v.alue of the work that they have performed
as measured by the benefit to appellants and discounted
by the fact that they failed to satisfy the condition
precedent. Their remedy cannot be enforce1nent of payment under a contract \vhen they have failed to meet an
express condition precedent to such payn1ent.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE EFFECT
TO THE EXPRESS O~E YEAR GUARANTEE AGAINST
STRUCTURAL DEFECTS.

As part of the eo . .1tract of purchase~ appellants insisted that they be givl•n a one year guarantee against
structur.al defects in the house. This guaranty "~as ineluded on a supple1nental sheet "~hich "\vas n1ade a part
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of the contract (Exhibit 2). The law of express warranties is not in dispute. Everyone agrees that if a structural defect occurred within a year from the date of
purchase, respondents are liable for the reasonable cost
to repair the defect. The nature of a promise constituting a guaranty or warranty, and the appropriate
remedy therefore, is outlined by Professor Corbin, op.

cit. supra, § 14 as follows:
"A promise may be expressed in the form
of a warranty, and that which appears to be the
object of desire and expectation on the part of
the promisee may be something over which the
promisor has absolutely no power or control.
Thus, as a part of a contract that A is making
with B, A may warr.ant rthat a horse is sound and
free from vice, or that a steel rail is free from
internal and invisible flaws, or that the ship
"Peerless" arrived in Amsterdam day before
yesterday. Warranties of this kind may turn out,
on proper interpretation, not to be promises .at
all, but to be mere representations of fact, the
truth of which is a condition precedent of the
other party. If proper interpretation, however,
shows them to be promises, it is believed that
what is being promised and what the promisee
is being led to expect on the part of the promisor,
is indemnification against loss, in case the facts
turn out to be not as represented. It is not that
the promisor will instantly make the vicious horse
gentle, or the steel rail flawless, or cause the
Peerless to have been in.,Amsterdam when she
wa1s in the B1ay 1of Bi~scay. '' (emphasris added)
1

It is readily seen that the case at bar is most closely
analagous to the defective steel rail, and that respondents,
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in effect, agreed to indemnify appellants against loss
for any structural defects which occurred within one
ye·ar from the date of the contract.
The question, therefore, is purely one of fact, i.e.,
whether the substantial crack in the garage wall and
the multiple leaks in the garage roof (patio) constituted
a structural defect within the contemplation of the parties
when they signed the contract. The contract of sale was
entered into on November 7, 1955. The defect alleged
by appellants was first noticed in May of 1956 (T-120),
which was about six months later and well within the
one ye,ar limitation. Hence, the time of the occurrence
of the alleged defect presents no problem, and our attention focuses upon the gravity of the alleged defect.
The evidence fairly tended to show that the crack
in the garage wall was obviours, substantial, in need of
immediwte rep·air, and was quite costly to repair (T-51) ;
and that there were cracks in the roof of the garage
(the patio) which allowed water to drip through the
entire are.a and drench the cars (T-45). Some of the
witnesses introduced by respondents testified that they
had made a casual inspection of the garage but tl1at they
hadn't noticed any signs of leaking. They testified that
it was not too light in the garage, .and that they opened
a door to enable them to see a little better. But they
did not pour water on the roof to deternrine the nature
and the extent of the leal\:, nor is there any"~here any
evidence that a very diligent effort 'vas made by these
witnesses to detern1ine the extent of the defect.
Appellants, on the other l1and, felt it necessary to
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have this condition repaired. They called Mr. Roberg,
a builder with Elias Morris & Sons Co. for over twenty
two years, and had him examine the roof to determine
how it could best be repaired (T-18, 19). Mr. Roberg
examined the roof and found evidence of serious leaking
all around the edges and in the middle, thereby requiring
a waterproof emulsion repair which it was estimated
would cost $1,287.50 (T-18, 19).
The question, therefore, is whether this condition
of the garage roof (patio) constitutes a structural defect
under the express one year guarantee (Exhibit 2). Respondents called a couple of witnesses who testified that
cement sometimes cracks, and that it isn't uncommon
to find some leaks re~ulting from weather cracks in
cement. It is submitted that this is insufficient to satisfy
ijhe guaranty by p~r.oving there w:as ·no defect.
Appellants were purchasing a new house. They expected everything in that house to be structurally sound
and, in order to insure that they would be so protected,
insisted upon the express guaranty. They had every
reason to expect that the roof on the garage would keep
out, rather than merely strain through, water. It is not
enough for respondent to show that leaks sometimes
occur in cement roofs. It would not even be enough if
respondent could show that it was common for cement
roofs to leak. We are dealing with a specific situation
where there was an express guaranty against structur:al
defects. There was evidence from .an expert that the
workmanship was defective, that adequate care had not
been taken in constructing the roof to insure against
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leakage, and that in fact there was considerable evidence
of leakage (T-18, 19). There was further testimony that
this was not a minor leak, but was a rapid dripping
over the entire surface of the roof (T-45). As a matter
of common knowle~dge, new roofs in expensive houses
do not leak in the absence of some defect. If there were
no express guaranty, p·erhaps the rule of caveat emptore
would ap·ply. But where there is an express guaranty,
and a ·defect occurs within the prescribed period of the
guaranty, it is elemental that the guarantor must resp-ond
in damages.
The error committed by the trial court was in assuming that there was no structural defect if it could
be shown that cement is prone to crack. This was an
erroneous test to apply to determine whether there was
a structural defect. The true test to be applied is whether
the parties, at the time they entered into the contract,
would have considered these defects to constitute "structural defects" within the meaning of the guaranty. In
other words, does it seem reasonable that appellant purchasers would have ente~red into the contract if they
would have. known that they would not be indemnified
against such defects under the guaranty. In light of all
of the facts and the surrounding eircun1stances, it is
submit,ted that both parties fairly conte1nplated that appellant purchasers 'Yould be inden1nified .against such
defects under the guaranty. The house "~as rather expensive ($36,000.00) and good quality ""'"orkinanship could
be expected. The garage 'vas attached to and 'vas p.art
of the house. Within six 1nonths fron1 the contract of
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sale, and well within the one year guaranty, theTe was
a serious crack in the. surrounding wall of the; garage
and serious leaks throughout the roof. Reasonable construction of the roof and patio in the first instance could
have prevented these defects (T-18, 19). It would indeed
be a stretch of the imagination to say that an expensive
home, while yet new, can have large cracks in the walls
and serious leaks in the roof without being defe.ctive. To
so hold is to strip the express guaranty of any effect
whatsoever, and to deny the appellants one of the essential express provisions of their bargain.
The counterclaim of the appellants should have· been
allowed under the express terms of the contract, and
the trial court erred in finding as a fact that there we-re
no structural defects.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE TRIAL ~COURT.

If there had been neither (1) an express condition
of satisfaction of the purchasers, nor ( 2) an express
one year guaranty against structural defects, the judgment of the trial court might or might not be defensible.
Indeed, the trial court seemed to arrive at its findings
of fact and conclusions of law without respect to the
express provisions m·entioned.
No one disputed nor discounted these express provisions. The evidence conclusively established the serious
leak in the garage roof (patio) and the wall. Expert
testimony said this could have been averted and that
the work was defective. Even if the work wasn't defective,
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extraneous forces caused a defect to appear within a
year. No one questioned appellant Mrs. Levinson's sincerity or good faith in her dissatisfaction with the work
in her house. Even Mr. Keene, a painter of experience,
testified that the finishing was not a good job and that
the painting was careless (T-2·6-32). Respondent Mr.
Haymore failed to show that reasonable work was p·erformed, and his testimony seems a general admission
of substandard work (T-6-15).
As already stated, ·One might challenge the judgment
of the court even if the condition and the guaranty had
not been in the contract. In light of the express condition
and the express guaranty, however, the judgment of
the trial court cannot stand under any view of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court failed
to honor the contract which appellants had made with
respondents. The court erred in that (1) it failed to give
effect to .an exp·ress condition of satisfaction of the
appellant purchasers, and (2) it failed to give effect to
an express one year guaranty against structural defects.
This Court is respectfully urged to affirm the principle
of freedom of contract by enforcing the reasonable
promises made by each party. The judgn1ent should be
reversed to provide that (1) appellants need not release
the escrow 1noney until the condition precedent of its
release is satisfied, and (:2) app·ellants be allowed the
reasonable sum of $1,287.50 to repair the structural de-
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feet in the garage roof (patio), plus the reasonable cost
of repair of the large crack in the garage wall, and
costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE & MECHAM
By Allan E. Me-cham
Attorney for Appellant
351 South State Street
S.alt Lake City 11, Utah
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